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Selective attention to a target yields faster and more accurate responses. Faster response times, in turn, are usually
associated with increased subjective conﬁdence. Could the decrease in reaction time in the presence of attention therefore
simply reﬂect a shift toward more conﬁdent responses? We here addressed the extent to which attention modulates
accuracy, processing speed, and conﬁdence independently. To probe the effect of spatial attention on performance, we
used two attentional manipulations of a visual orientation discrimination task. We demonstrate that spatial attention
signiﬁcantly increases accuracy, whereas subjective conﬁdence measures reveal overconﬁdence in non-attended stimuli.
At constant conﬁdence levels, reaction times showed a signiﬁcant decrease (by 15–49%, corresponding to 100–250 ms).
This dissociation of objective performance and subjective conﬁdence suggests that attention and awareness, as measured
by conﬁdence, are distinct, albeit related, phenomena.
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Introduction
More than a century of research has quantified the
ample, objective benefits accrued to attended objects, or
events (Pashler, Johnston, & Ruthruff, 2001; Posner &
Petersen, 1990; Treisman, 2006). In contrast, much less is
known about the direct influence of attention on subjective
confidence in one’s perceptual decisions. Confidence is
considered to be intrinsically linked to stimulus awareness
as an index of subjective perception (Kunimoto, Miller, &
Pashler, 2001; Szczepanowski & Pessoa, 2007): Aware-
ness of a stimulus allows the observer to have higher
confidence in his or her judgment of the stimulus
(Kunimoto et al., 2001) and increases their willingness
to wager high on their decision (Koch & Preuschoff, 2007;
Persaud, McLeod, & Cowey, 2007). Such subjective
confidence measures vary in a predictable manner with
the performance of human (Kolb & Braun, 1995; Morgan,
Mason, & Solomon, 1997) and non-human subjects
(Shields, Smith, Guttmannova, & Washburn, 2005; Smith
et al., 1995). The debate whether subjective measures, such
as confidence ratings, capture awareness better than
objective performance metrics has been ongoing since the
early days of empirical psychophysics (Merikle, Smilek, &
Eastwood, 2001; Peirce & Jastrow, 1884; Szczepanowski
& Pessoa, 2007). The dissociation between subjective
measures of confidence and objective performance is most
evident in two extreme clinical examples, blindsight and
Anton’s blindness (Anton-Babinski syndrome): In the
former, patients perform visual tasks well above chance
despite being reportedly unaware of their percepts
(Stoerig & Cowey, 2007; Weiskrantz, 2004). In the latter,
the reverse occurs, patients claim to see, although
objective measures confirm their blindness (e.g., Roos,
Tuite, Below, & Pascuzzi, 1990). For normal observers,
however, the relation between subjective confidence
measures and performance has received surprisingly little
Journal of Vision (2008) 8(5):7, 1–10 http://journalofvision.org/8/5/7/ 1
doi: 10 .1167 /8 .5 .7 Received January 22, 2008; published May 19, 2008 ISSN 1534-7362 * ARVO
investigation, in particular with respect to their modula-
tion by attention. This is remarkable, as the speed of
perceptual processes, probed via reaction time, is influ-
enced not only by confidence but also by attention: Unless
external stopping rules are used (Vickers, Smith, Burt, &
Brown, 1985), reaction time and confidence rating are
intrinsically linked in an inverse relationship (Audley,
1960; Baranski & Petrusic, 1998; Henmon, 1911), up to
the point that sometimes reaction times are substituted as
measure of confidence. However, equating reaction time
with confidence is problematic as attention influences
reaction times (Posner, 1980). If spatial attention is
directed toward the location of a target, reaction times at
the attended location are faster than at unattended
locations. Therefore, reaction time, confidence ratings,
and attention all appear to be related, yet the nature of
relationship is not known. Specifically, since reaction
times are slower in the absence of attention, the attention-
related increase in reaction time could simply reflect a
shift toward less confident responses. Surprisingly, hardly
any studies have directly addressed the three-way inter-
action between objective, subjective performance, and
attention. One notable exception was the demonstration of
a reaction time decrease in the presence of spatial
attention without awareness in one blindsight subject
(Kentridge, Heywood, & Weiskrantz, 2004). Here we
address the threefold relation between attention, reaction
time, and confidence in normal observers. We employed
an orientation discrimination task, while manipulating the
distribution of spatial attention using a classic cueing
paradigm in a single stimulus environment (Experiment 1)
and a precue–postcue paradigm in a dual-stimulus
environment (Experiment 2). In both settings, observers
rate the confidence of their response.
Experiment 1
Materials and methods
Volunteers were recruited from the Caltech campus and
gave written informed consent. They had normal or
corrected-to-normal eyesight. Experiments were approved
by the Institutional Review Board. Nine volunteers, naive
to the purpose of the experiment, participated. They were
instructed to make two decisions on whether a grating was
tilted toward the left or the right while also rating their
subjective confidence in this decision by pushing one of
six buttons on a computer keyboard: the grating tilted
leftward, high confidence (for analysis coded as 3); left,
medium confidence (coded as 2); left, low confidence (1);
right, low confidence (1); right, medium confidence (2);
and right, high confidence (3).
Each trial began with the participant fixating an arrow
pointing either upward or downward (Figure 1). Stimuli
were presented on a 20-in. CRT monitor (resolution
1024*768 pixel; refresh rate 120 Hz) located 80 cm from
the subjects. Eye movements were monitored online at
1000 Hz using an Eyelink 1000 (SR Research, Osgoode,
Canada) eye-tracking device, and the stimulus presenta-
tion was started after participants continuously fixated on
the arrow for 500 ms. When participants did not properly
fixate on the arrow for 500 ms, the trial was aborted and
restarted. Participants were instructed to respond quickly
and accurately reflecting their orientation judgment and
the confidence level.
The stimulus, a sinusoidal grating (patch size of 5-,
8 cycles per patch; minimum luminance 0.001 cd/m2, maxi-
mum luminance 26 cd/m2; background screen 13 cd/m2),
Figure 1. Experiment 1: Time course of the paradigm: Subjects had to indicate whether the patch, appearing either at a cued or a non-
cued location, was tilted to the left or to the right and their conﬁdence in this judgment.
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was tilted toward the left or right by one of six difficulty
levels (0.5-, 1-, 2-, 4-, 8-, 16-). The grating was presented
for 100 ms either 5- above or below the center of the
arrow, then masked by a plaid, consisting of vertical and
horizontal sinusoidal gratings for 500 ms. The range of
difficulty levels was adjusted in pilot studies by varying
the orientation of the grating away from the vertical to let
participants use the whole range from “very confident” to
“guessed” responses. Participants performed an initial
training block (96 trials) to stabilize performance. For
the 6 following experimental blocks (96 trials each), the
arrow correctly indicated the location of the subsequent
target in 75% of the trials (high attention condition) and
incorrectly in 25% of the trials (low attention condition).
Data from one participant and data of one block of a
second participant were excluded as eye position during
stimulus presentation was two standard deviations out of
the range of all other data (92- of visual angle).
We analyzed percentage correct as determined by
classic forced-choice measures, mean confidence for
correct responses and reaction time for correct responses
of high, medium, and low confidence. Furthermore, to
allow comparison of the attention-related change in
different measures of objective performance (% correct
responses), confidence and reaction times, we z-trans-
formed all measures to a common mean (0) and standard
deviation (1) (z-standardization). Accuracy for the ori-
entation discrimination (Wickens, 2001) was determined
by calculating the area under the ROC curve for this
objective measure (AUCobjective). We defined a response
as “Hit” when a left tilted stimulus was judged as left and
as “False Alarm” when a left tilted stimulus was judged as
right (ROC analysis for objective measure; Galvin, Podd,
Drga, & Whitmore, 2003; Kunimoto et al., 2001). We
constructed an ROC curve with two inflection points from
the confidence data: Correct responses with higher con-
fidence were regarded as “Hit” and incorrect responses with
higher confidence were regarded as “False alarm” (Galvin
et al., 2003; Kunimoto et al., 2001; Szczepanowski &
Pessoa, 2007). We denote the area under this ROC curve
as AUCsubjective. Statistics on all AUC values were per-
formed on logit-transformed AUC values (log(p / (1j p))).
For easy interpretation, we report inverse transformed
values. Comparisons between high and low attention
conditions are paired t tests.
Results
Correct responses showed the classic effect of increased
performance in the presence of spatial attention: an
increase from 73.7 T 3.3% (mean T standard error of mean)
in the low attention to 77.4 T 2.8% correct performance in
the high attention-condition (p = 0.002). This effect is also
reflected in the area under the ROC curve, AUCobjective,
which increased significantly (p = 0.004) from 0.74 T 0.04
to 0.77 T 0.03 when switching from low to high attention
Figure 2. Experiment 1: Attention-related change in z-stand-
ardized objective and subjective measures of performance and
reaction time: High attention leads to a signiﬁcant increase in
objective measures of performance (p = 0.002) and to a
signiﬁcant decrease in re-action time (p = 0.002), but not to a
signiﬁcant change in subjective measures of performance (p =
0.467). Changes in objective measures and reaction times are
signiﬁcantly larger than the one in subjective measures (p = 0.002
and p = 0.006 respectively).
Figure 3. Experiment 1: Correlation between performance
(% correct responses) and conﬁdence over the six different
difﬁculty levels: Mean conﬁdence and mean percentage of correct
responses, averaged over 8 subjects, for each individual difﬁculty
level (0.5°, 1°, 2°, 4°, 8°, 16°) are correlated under both low
( r = 0.93; p = 0.007) and high attention ( r = 0.92; p = 0.007) load.
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conditions. On the contrary, there was no significant
difference (p = 0.462) in the mean confidence for the
correct decision under low- and high-attention conditions
(Table 2). Equally, AUCsubjective did not increase signifi-
cantly (Table 3).
In order to directly compare subjective and objective
performance measures, i.e., confidence ratings and per-
centage correct responses, as well as reaction times, we
z-transformed these 3 types of data. Z-transformed fraction
of correct responses increased from j0.21 T 0.39 to
0.21 T 0.32 (p = 0.002; Figure 2). The difference in
z-transformed confidence between the low (0.03 T 0.34)
and the high (-0.03 T 0.39) attention did not reach
significance (p = 0.467; Figure 2). The influence of
attention on z-transformed performance was larger than on
z-transformed confidence (p = 0.001).
Does this simply reflect an overall lack of awareness
about performance? To test whether participants adjust
their confidence according to performance, we computed
the correlation between performance and mean confidence
separately for the different tilt angles (Figure 3), corre-
sponding to different difficulty levels. In Experiment 1, the
correlation between mean confidence and performance
over these six difficulty levels was significant within
different attentional conditions, both under low (r = 0.93;
p = 0.007) and high attention (r = 0.92; p = 0.007). Thus,
while subjects adjust their confidence according to
stimulus-induced changes in performance, they fail to do
so for attention-induced changes in performance.
The lack of a clear difference in mean confidence for
attended and unattended correct responses cannot be
easily explained by an overall lack in awareness of
performance. Thus, the fact that confidence is kept
nearly constant between attention-induced changes in
performance indicates an overconfidence in judgments in
the (near) absence of attention relative to the confidence
in judgments to attended stimuli.
How does the attentional manipulation influence reac-
tion time (RT)? RT shows the classic effect (Posner, 1980)
of decreasing in the high (0.577 T 0.180 s for correct
responses) compared to the low attention condition (0.735 T
0.040 s) (p = 0.002; see also Figure 2). The lack of a clear
difference in overall confidence makes it unlikely that
this increase in RT can be solely explained by a shift
toward less confident responses. Indeed, the influence of
attention onto z-standardized RT is significantly larger
than on z-standardized confidence judgments (p = 0.006;
Figure 2). To confirm an increase of RT without a change
in confidence we computed reaction times for each level
of confidence separately. Within similar levels of con-
fidence, the RT for correct responses to non-attended
stimuli increased by 100–230 ms (corresponding to a
20–28% increase relative to the 75% condition; 0.02 G
p G 0.002; Figure 4).
Thus, attention boosts objective measures of perception
(performance, AUCobjective and RT) but not subjective
measure (confidence in decision and AUCsubjective)
(Tables 1, 2, and 3) indicating a relative overconfidence
when judging non-attended stimuli.
A potential confound can arise from the instruction
given to the participants to respond “as fast and as
Figure 4. Experiment 1: Increase in RT for conﬁdence judgments
for n = 8 subjects (similar levels of conﬁdence) for the low spatial
attention condition as the absolute difference with low and high
attention condition in milliseconds (top) and as RT percentage
relative to the condition under high attention (bottom). [* depicts
p G 0.05; ** p G 0.01; ***p G 0.001; error bars depict standard error
of mean].
Experiment 1 Experiment 2, single response Experiment 2, dual response
High attention 77.4 T 2.8 78.0 T 2.6 76.9 T 2.9
Low attention 73.7 T 3.3 68.3 T 3.3 70.3 T 2.8
p-value of comparison j0.002 G0.001 G0.001
Table 1. Comparison of performance levels.
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accurate as possible.” As participants have to make two
decisions (the orientation discrimination and a meta-
decision about the confidence they have in this decision),
it is possible that confidence ratings require longer
processing times and are therefore less accurate given
the speedy response paradigm. Signal detection theory
commonly uses one-response schemes (Wickens, 2001),
whereas classic paradigms are not speeded. In fact, in
many studies investigating confidence judgments, two
responses are made, one after another (Kunimoto et al.,
2001; Szczepanowski & Pessoa, 2007). Therefore, in a
second experiment, we directly compared the effects of
making a single complex versus two simpler decisions in
series. For this, we employed a postcueing paradigm
Gorea and Sagi (2001) to investigate the effects of top-
down attention. This technique allowed us to more
efficiently collect data for attended versus unattended
stimuli in equal numbers. Furthermore, in Experiment 1,
the low attention condition was three times less frequent
in the high attention condition. This might create an
additional bias the precue–postcue paradigm avoids
(Gorea & Sagi, 2001).
Experiment 2
Materials and methods
Nine volunteers, naive to the purpose of the experiment,
participated in Experiment 2. They were instructed to
decide whether a grating was tilted toward the left or
right. Each volunteer participated in two versions of the
experiment on two different days. In one version (one-
response condition), participants indicated their decision
about the orientation judgment and rated their subjective
confidence with a six alternative choice confidence scale,
as in Experiment 1. In another version (two-response
condition), participants first indicated their orientation
judgment (left–right) and then rated their confidence about
this decision on a three alternative choice scale (high,
medium, and low confidence), as in the traditional experi-
ment with confidence rating. The order of the conditions
was randomized over all participants. Each trial began
with the participant fixating on a cross (Figure 5). Eye
movements were monitored online as above, and the cue
presentation was started after participants continuously
fixated on the fixation cross for 500 ms. When participants
failed to fixate properly, the trial was aborted and restarted,
as in Experiment 1.
After 500-ms fixation in 50% of the trials, a precue was
presented for 500 ms pointing either upward or downward
at the stimulus location (high attention condition). Two
sinusoidal gratings were presented, one (the target) at the
location indicated by the precue and the other one (the
distractor) at the opposite location. The precue was 100%
valid; thus, after the arrow, participants could focus their
attention on the target and disregard the distractor. In the
remaining 50% of the trials, two precue arrows were
presented instead of the unambiguous single one (Figure 5),
indicating that participants had to wait for the postcue to
know the location of the target. Thus, in these trials,
participants did not know at the time of stimulus presen-
tation the respective locations of the target and the
distractor and therefore had to split their attention between
both locations. In the following, we call this the low
attention condition.
Both target and distractor were similar to those in
Experiment 1 with the exception of orientation angles
(1-, 2-, 4-, 8-, 10-, 16-). Gratings were presented 3.5-
above and below the fixated location for 100 ms, then
masked by a plaid for 250 ms. A postcue was presented for
500 ms pointing either upward or downward indicating the
target location. In the precue trials, this information was
merely a repetition of the precue information. Participants
performed an initial training block (96 trials) to stabilize
performance followed by 5 experimental blocks (96 trials
Experiment 1 Experiment 2, single response Experiment 2, dual response
Objective Subjective Objective Subjective Objective Subjective
High attention 0.77 T 0.03 0.73 T 0.03 0.78 T 0.03 0.74 T 0.03 0.77 T 0.03 0.71 T 0.03
Low attention 0.74 T 0.04 0.70 T 0.03 0.69 T 0.03 0.65 T 0.03 0.71 T 0.03 0.67 T 0.04
p-value 0.004 0.124 G0.001 0.023 0.004 0.034
Table 3. Comparison of area under the ROC curve (AUC) for objective and subjective measures.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2, single response Experiment 2, dual response
High attention 2.09 T 0.12 2.37 T 0.14 2.29 T 0.11
Low attention 2.11 T 0.11 2.19 T 0.13 2.20 T 0.07
p-value of comparison 0.462 0.033 0.132
Table 2. Comparison of mean conﬁdence levels.
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each). Data from two subjects were excluded as their
performance did not exceed 54% correct for precue or
postcue condition.
Results
As expected, performance increased significantly with
attention in both conditions; from 68.3 T 3.3% correct
responses to 78.0 T 2.6% for the one-response experiment
(p G 0.001; Table 1) and from 70.3 T 2.8% to 76.9 T 2.9%
in the two-response condition (p G 0.001, Table 1). For the
one-response condition, the difference between the mean
confidence for correct decisions increased from 2.19 T
0.13 to 2.37 T 0.14 with attention (a significant difference
at p = 0.033; Table 2). AUCobjective increased from 0.69 T
0.03 to 0.78 T 0.03 with attention (p G 0.001), while
confidence rose significantly (p = 0.023) from 0.65 T 0.03
to 0.74 T 0.04 (Table 3). Z-transformed objective measures
of performance (percentage of correct responses) increased
fromj0.54 T 0.96 to 0.54 T 0.76 with attention (p G 0.001;
Figure 6). The difference in z-transformed confidence
between low (0.51 T 0.76) and high (0.89 T 0.76) attention
was significant (p = 0.033). The influence of attention on
z-transformed percentage correct responses was still larger
than on z-transformed confidence ratings (p = 0.007).
For the two-response condition, the difference between
the mean confidence did not significantly differ between
the two attention conditions (p = 0.132; Table 2).
AUCobjective increased significantly (p = 0.004) from
0.71 T 0.03 to 0.77 T 0.03, as did AUCsubjective (from
0.67 T 0.04 to 0.71 T 0.04 with p = 0.034; Table 3).
Z-transformed objective measures of performance
increased from j0.41 T 0.92 in the low attention to
Figure 5. Experiment 2: Time course of the precue-postcue-paradigm: Subjects had to indicate whether the target was tilted to the left or
the right and their conﬁdence in this judgment. The target location was indicated either by a precue (high attention) or a postcue (low
attention condition); the conﬁdence judgment was either given at the same time as the conﬁdence judgment (1 response condition) or
sequentially (2 response condition).
Figure 6. Experiment 2: Attention-related change in z-stand-
ardized objective and subjective measures of performance and
reaction time in the one response condition (blue) and the two-
response condition (green): High attention leads to a signiﬁcant
increase in objective measures of performance (p G 0.001 for both
conditions) and a signiﬁcant decrease in RT (p = 0.026 and p =
0.008 respectively), but only a signiﬁcant change in subjective
measures of performance in the one response condition (p =
0.033). Changes inobjective measures and RT are signiﬁcantly
larger than the ones in subjective measures (p = 0.024 and p =
0.030 for the one response condition and p = 0.007 and p = 0.008
for the two response condition).
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0.41 T 0.96 in the high attention condition (p G 0.001).
The difference in z-transformed confidence between the
low (j0.15 T 0.70) and high (0.18 T 1.05) was not
significant (p = 0.132). The influence of attention on
z-transformed percentage correct responses was larger than
on z-transformed confidence ratings (p = 0.024; Figure 6).
Again, confidence increases more or less linearly with
performance (Figure 7), both in the one-response con-
dition under low (r = 0.98; p G 0.001) and high attention
(r = 0.99; p G 0.001) as well as in the two-response
condition under low (r = 0.99; p G 0.001) and high
attention (r = 0.99; p G 0.001).
The significant correlation between performance and
confidence judgments indicate that the larger influence of
attention on objective over subjective measures is not
solely due to an overall lack in awareness of performance,
again indicating an overconfidence when judging in the
(near) absence of attention relative to the confidence in
judgment to attended stimuli.
Reaction times decrease under high attention in the one
response condition (0.809 T 0.490 s for correct responses
under low and 0.581 T 0.374 s under high attention;
p = 0.008) as well as the two response condition (0.635 T
0.280 s under low and 0.455 T 0.101 s under high
attention; p = 0.029). In both conditions, the influence
of attention on z-standardized RT was larger than on
z-standardized confidence judgments (p = 0.030 in the
one-response condition and p = 0.008 in the two-response
condition). To test the influence of confidence on reaction
times, we again computed RT for each level of confidence
separately. For similar levels of confidence, RT for non-
attended stimuli increase by 130–176 ms in the one-
response condition, corresponding to a 17–49% increase
in RT relative to the high attention condition (0.030 9
p 9 0.004; see Figure 8) and by 125–223 ms in the two-
response condition, corresponding to a 20–42% increase
in RT relative to the high attention condition (0.032 9
p 9 0.003; see Figure 8).
Measures of performance did not differ between the
one-response and the two-response conditions (for per-
centage correct responses in the high attention condition,
p = 0.597, and in the low attention condition p = 0.414;
for AUCobjective in the high attention p = 0.614, and
p = 0.388 in the low attention condition). Equally,
measures of confidence did not differ between response
conditions (for mean confidence in the high attention
condition p = 0.851, and p = 0.397 for the low attention
condition; for AUCsubjective in the high attention p = 0.192,
and p = 0.350 in the low-attention condition). Likewise,
the difference in RT did not reach significance for each
confidence level and attentional manipulation (for the
high attention 0.313 9 p 9 0.189 and for the low
attention condition 0.475 9 p 9 0.155).
Whether participants responded by giving the orienta-
tion judgment and the confidence judgment at the same
time (one-response condition) or sequentially (two-
response condition), neither objective nor subjective
measures were affected significantly. Yet the influence of
attention on RT for similar levels of confidence remains
strong. The attentional manipulation in Experiment 2
strongly changes objective measures of performance
(percentage correct responses and AUCobjective) (Tables 1
and 3) but has a much weaker influence on AUCsubjective
(Table 3) and on confidence level (Table 2). Z-stand-
ardized analysis confirms this stronger influence of
attention on objective than on subjective measures. As
Figure 7. Experiment 2: Correlation between performance
(% correct responses) and mean conﬁdence over the six different
difﬁculty levels: Mean conﬁdence and mean percentage of correct
responses, averaged over 7 subjects, for each individual difﬁculty
level (1°, 2°, 4°, 8°, 10°, 16°) show a high correlation for the
one-response condition (top) under low (r = 0.98; p G 0.001) and
high attention (r = 0.99; p G 0.001) and for the two- response
condition (bottom) under low (r = 0.99; p G 0.001) and high
attention (r = 0.99; p G 0.001).
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confidence is a good predictor of performance within a
constant attentional condition, this reflects a relative
overconfidence in non-attended judgments. Furthermore,
if the influence of attention on subjective measures was
just weaker albeit closely related to the one on objective
measures, we would expect a relationship between the
attentional shift in both AUCobjective and AUCsubjective.
That is, participants who show a weak influence of
attention on AUCobjective also should show a weak
influence of attention on the corresponding subjective
measure. We did not find such a positive correlation
between the individual attentional shift in either AUC
(Experiment 1: r = j0.35; p = 0.367; Experiment 2 (one
response): r = j0.14; p = 0.765; Experiment 2 (two
responses): r = j0.27; p = 0.556; population analysis over
all 3 experiments: r = 0.13; p = 0.550). Hence, the
influence of attention on subjective performance cannot be
merely attributed to the shift in objective performance.
Discussion
We investigated the influence of attention on both
subjective confidence and objective performance meas-
ures using two different attentional manipulations. No
matter whether the manipulations of attention resulted in a
weak (Experiment 1) or in a substantial (Experiment 2)
difference in performance, confidence levels for attended
and unattended stimuli showed (nearly) no changes. This
argues against the hypothesis that withdrawing attention
from a stimulus location primarily decreases confidence.
There is no evident difference between confidence for
attended and less or non-attended stimuli. As this negative
result does not reflect the actual performance difference
between attentional conditions, it may either be interpreted
as overconfidence in unattended stimuli or as a lack of
confidence in attended stimuli. In contrast, within one
attentional condition, stimulus-induced changes in per-
formance were accurately reflected in confidence measures.
Even under presumably constant attention conditions,
objective and subjective measures can be dissociated
under certain conditions, for example, in a metacontrast
masking paradigm at certain SOAs (Lau & Passingham,
2006). Similarly, for different difficulty levels easy
decisions tend to lead to underconfidence and difficult
decisions to overconfidence (Baranski & Petrusic, 1994,
1999; but see Olsson & Winman, 1996). In its most
straightforward interpretation, this somewhat counterin-
tuitive result is a consequence of a combination of a floor
and a ceiling effect: Underconfidence for easy conditions
results from some residual subjective uncertainty at
(near-)perfect performance, while even at guessing levels
observers occasionally report being very confident of their
decision (Baranski & Petrusic, 1999). In line with such
data, in our paradigm observers are more likely to be
overconfident, when less attention is allocated to a
stimulus location. Changes of confidence levels are
smaller than changes in actual performance with and
without attention. This effect reaches significance only for
the largest performance difference (Experiment 2, one-
response condition), apparently reflecting observers’ ten-
dency to keep overall confidence more constant than the
actual performance might suggest. ROC measures for
subjective confidence (AUCsubjective) similarly show an
influence of attentional manipulation only for large shifts
in objective measures (Experiment 2), but not weak ones
(Experiment 1). Without direct correlation between both
measures on an individual level, this provides more
evidence for a dissociation between objective and sub-
jective measures of performance. The weak influence of
attentional manipulation on confidence suggests that
directing attention to a target may not affect the way
some of its attributes are consciously experienced. Using
solely objective measures, previous studies provided
contradictory evidence: Selective attention does not affect
perceived brightness of stimuli (Prinzmetal, Nwachuku,
Figure 8. Experiment 2: Increase in RT for conﬁdence judgments
for n = 7 subjects (similar levels of conﬁdence) under reduced
spatial attention as the absolute difference between condition with
low and high attention condition in milliseconds (left) and as RT
percentage relative to the condition under high attention (right).
[* depicts p G 0.05; ** p G 0.01; ***p G 0.001; error bars depict
standard error of mean].
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Bodanski, Blumenfeld, & Shimizu, 1997) or color
appearance (Blaser, Sperling, & Lu, 1999), but exogenous
transient attention increases the apparent contrast of a
stimulus (Carrasco, Ling, & Read, 2004). This discrep-
ancy illuminates the need to integrate different measures
of performance, both objective and subjective ones, into
attention research. Only then the extent to which these
results rely on the exact measure or on the experimental
methodology used to manipulate attention can be assessed.
The lack of difference between the one- and the two-
response condition argues against the view that decisions
about confidence are reached substantially later in time
than the perceptual decision itself (Baranski & Petrusic,
1998). Actually, the only significant difference between
confidence levels is found in a one-response condition
ruling out the possibility that the lack of change in
confidence is a consequence of the subject’s response in
the one-response condition preceding a subsequent meta-
decision about confidence. Instead, the subjective feeling
of confidence may be present and accessed at the time of
the decision.
In contrast to the weak or altogether absent influence of
attention on the overall level of confidence, we find
substantial differences in reaction times for similar levels
of subjective confidence. This implies that reaction times
cannot be used as a measure of awareness as assayed by
confidence without controlling for the effects of attention:
For different amounts of spatial attention, substantially
different levels of reaction time are associated with similar
levels of confidence. The importance of carefully control-
ling attentional effects in studies of awareness has already
been highlighted (Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 2007).
Interestingly, a possible dissociation between reaction
times and confidence-related measures has been reported
in rats in an olfactory perceptual discrimination task
(Uchida, Kepecs, & Mainen, 2006; Uchida & Mainen,
2003). Our study shows that the decrease in reaction time
in the presence of attention is in general unrelated to the
aspect of conscious awareness that is probed by con-
fidence measures. Hence, the reaction time disadvantage
in the near absence of spatial attention cannot be
explained by a shift toward lower confidence but instead
reveals a signature of an attentional mechanism not
related to stimulus awareness. This further buttresses the
claim that attention and awareness are distinct, although
related, processes (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache,
Sackur, & Sergent, 2006; Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007;
Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 2004; Merikle et al., 2001).
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